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Prologue
The Corcorans lost their unborn child because a
benefit administrator for United Healthcare
determined that hospitalization was not
medically necessary.1  They Sued. But because
their benefit plan was governed by ERISA, they
were denied any remedy, state or federal, for an
outcome that may have been the result of a
ghastly mistake. The Kuhls may be forgiven if,
in their private moments, expressed a sense of
companionship, for they also have a tale of
equal gravitas. In 1993, they brought suit
against Lincoln National Plan of Kansas City,
citing wrongful death because the health plan
delayed authorization of heart surgery.2  The
judge dismissed the case; he had to. A plaintiff
who sues under ERISA is entitled to either
specific performance or recovery of cost of
services denied; wrongful death is not a proper
ground for recovery. Too bad!
Introduction
In 1967, Senator Jacob Javits sponsored a
pension reform bill that later became what is
currently known as ERISA, but formally, the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act.3
Enacted in 1974, ERISA was the federal
government’s response to very painful abuses
of pension plans in the 1960s, two of which are
particularly noteworthy: the 1963 termination
by Studebaker of its pension plan that covered
4000 employees, leaving them without the
promised benefits and no recourse;4  and the
gross misuse of the Central Teamsters Pension
fund that left beneficiaries empty handed after
laboring for 20 years or more.5  Upon
enactment of ERISA, Senator Javits remarked
that the central goal of the act is “[t]o maintain
the voluntary growth of private pension and
employee benefit plans while at the same time
making needed structural reforms in such areas
as vesting, funding, and termination so as to
safeguard workers against loss of their earned
or anticipated benefits….”6  Ironically, the major
provision in ERISA, its preemption clause, has
created more uncertainty about the adequacy
and soundness of health care benefits than any
other federal legislation that purports to protect
workers’ welfare. Since ERISA does not
regulate the content of employer provided
health care plans, it relies instead on disclosure,
administrative requirements, and fiduciary
2obligations to minimize employer indiscretion
and abuses.
ERISA expressly provides that state laws that
regulate employer-provided benefit plans
should have no effect, unless such laws
regulate insurance.7  Moreover, if benefit plans
are self-funded, they are also exempt from state
insurance regulations. This complete
preemption of states’ ability to oversee benefit
plans offered by employers has created a
regulation-free zone in which the states have
no power to regulate, and the federal
government has not bothered to regulate the
content of employee benefit plans.8
The thrust of this paper is that ERISA, while
well-intentioned, detracts inordinately from
employees’ welfare through its overly
restrictive preemption clause. It will be argued
that because the various provisions of the act
unduly constrain employees’ economic choices,
their right to contract freely, and the ability of
plan beneficiaries to seek legal recourse
generally available to those covered by non-
ERISA plans, employees will be better served if
the act is restructured to address these issues.
Part II of the paper will discuss the
implementation of ERISA within the context of
the US health care system.  Part III discusses
the constitutional basis for ERISA and its
preemption clause; Part IV provides a policy
analysis and remedial measures. Part V will
conclude.
II. ERISA In The Context Of The US
Health Care System
The blatant misuse and outright
misappropriation of pension funds in the 1960s
notwithstanding, the need for health care
reform was already beginning to inform and
shape the debate on how to manage the
nation’s overly inefficient health care delivery
system.9  This need for greater efficiency meant
looking at different models for delivering
health care services, and through this effort the
managed care industry was born; and in short
order, ERISA came into existence. As crafted,
ERISA provides uniform federal guidelines and
regulations for the administration of employee
benefits and pension plans. While the act does
not require employers to offer benefits, it does,
however, require those that offer employee
benefits to abide by the act’s mandates.1 0
The US is unique amongst the industrialized
nations in the extent to which private insurance
is relied on to finance health care services.
Expenditure on private insurance in 1996, for
example, amounted to $390 billion or 33% of
total expenditure on health insurance;1 1 the
federal government, philanthropic institutions,
and state governments paid the rest.1 2 This
disproportionate reliance on private insurance
is the direct consequence of government
subsidies through tax policies; employer
contributions toward employee health
insurance are exempt from taxation under the
federal income tax scheme.1 3 A better
understanding of private financing of health
care in the US is, perhaps, enhanced by
focusing on the structure of third-party payers.
This group may be divided into two camps:
one is the traditional indemnity insurance and
service benefit plans that simply offer blanket
coverage for health risks, and will indemnify
patients for covered health care expenditures or
pay the health care provider directly; the other
is the managed care group such as HMOs,
PPOs (preferred provider organizations), and a
host of managed care plans. The trend towards
this latter group has been remarkable; so much
so that only about 4% of private insurance is
currently covered by the traditional fee-for-
service plans.1 4 Managed care is now the
fashionable mode of health care delivery in the
nation.1 5
3The above classification feeds directly into the
more useful distinction for our immediate
purpose, the distinction between private payers
subject to federal oversight and those subject to
state regulations. In the recent past, state
governments were the primary regulators of
private health insurance. This fact was made
perfectly clear in the McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, that confirmed the
primacy of states in the area of health care
regulation, and forbade interference from the
federal government.1 6 Thus, for a very long
period, the relationship between insurers and
the insured was governed by state regulations,
and state common law of contract and tort.
However, beginning in 1974, with passage of
ERISA, states’ authority to regulate the most
common form of private health insurance,
employee health benefits, was sharply
curtailed. ERISA established uniform national
standards for employee benefit plans and
preempts, to a very large extent, state
regulation of these plans. Nonetheless, states
still retain full authority to regulate individual
and group insurance policies that do not relate
to employee benefit plans.
Statistically, approximately 70% of the privately
insured gets their coverage through
employment-related benefit plans that are
subject to ERISA.1 7 Of this group, about 33% of
beneficiaries is covered under self-funded
employee benefit plans that are completely
exempt from state regulation by ERISA.1 8 The
remaining 39% is non-self-funded ERISA plans
subject to state regulation only to the extent
that relevant state laws are considered to
regulate insurance.1 9 Thus, state laws that
regulate employee benefit plans but do not
regulate insurance are preempted by ERISA.
While ERISA continues to perlplex, it is
noteworthy that states remain primarily
responsible for regulating many health plans
that are subject to ERISA as well as insurance
plans not subject to ERISA, e.g. individual
health insurance plans, group insurance plans
covering state employees, local government
employees or church employees. Indeed,
ERISA covers only employee benefit plans
established and maintained by an employer as
part of employment compensation package for
its workers. This does not include individual
health plans purchased by employees outside
their employment, and without contributions
from the employer.2 0
Remedies under ERISA for participants
wrongfully denied treatment are remarkably
limited. An aggrieved plan participant, for
example, can only bring legal action to recover
denied benefits, and these benefits are
restricted to specific performance or
reimbursement for actual services received
outside the plan.2 1 Thus, ERISA has no
provision for punitive damages.  A plan
participant can sue the plan administrator for
breach of fiduciary duties, but any recovered
damages go to the plan, not to the aggrieved
participant because the act views the plan as
the damaged party in such litigations.2 2
III. Constitutional Basis for ERISA
At the outset, it must be taken as given that the
concept of federalism embodied in the US
constitution requires a certain degree of
concurrency of state and federal legislative
authority.2 3 Thus, the states and the federal
government may enjoy concurrent legislative
authority over specific subject areas for which
Congress is granted the powers enumerated in
Article 1.2 4 In instances of concurrent
jurisdiction, two unique constitutional
instruments — the Supremacy and Commerce
clauses, and express congressional preemption
— serve as mediating devices. For our
immediate objective, two kinds of preemption
may be distinguished: constitutional and
legislative. Constitutional preemption refers to
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution that
requires preemption of any state law that
4conflicts with or is inconsistent with federal
law. Moreover, in instances when Congress has
yet to act, the “dormant Commerce Clause”
may be invoked to invalidate state laws that
unreasonably burden interstate commerce
which Congress has the Article 1 power to
regulate.2 5 Thus, when Congress has the
constitutional power to regulate but has not
exercised this power, the dormant commerce
clause empowers courts to invalidate any state
law that unduly interferes with interstate
commerce.2 6
Legislative preemption occurs when Congress
expressly invalidates state laws in areas  which
Congress has the constitutional authority to
regulate, e.g. interstate commerce.2 7
Furthermore, Congress may implicitly preempt
state regulation by showing its intent to occupy
an area exclusively, even though no federal law
embodying such intent is in conflict with state
regulations. ERISA’s preemption clause, by the
above classification, is a legislative preemption.
The act, in relevant part, states that ERISA
“shall supersede any and all state laws in so far
as they relate to any employee benefit plan.”2 8
Thus, in adjudicating ERISA cases, courts must
engage in statutory interpretation of the act’s
provisions to ascertain whether in ERISA
Congress claimed all or a fraction of the
concurrent jurisdiction.
ERISA’s Preemptive Powers
The issue of complete preemption has been a
major source of discomfort for plan
participants. A state regulation that provides
plan beneficiaries with remedies or grounds for
legal action that are similar to or in conflict
with the civil enforcement provisions of section
502(a) of ERISA are subject to “complete
preemption” because they trigger a federal
jurisdiction doctrine.2 9 Complete preemption
occurs when a federal law “completely
preempts an area that any civil complaint
raising this select group of claims is necessarily
federal in character.”3 0 This provision
empowers plan administrators to force the
removal of cases filed in state courts to federal
courts, in the main, because remedies under
ERISA, as previously mentioned, are restricted
to equitable relief. Another form of preemption
under ERISA is the “conflict Preemption”
mechanism of section 514(a) that goes into
effect  when a state law “relates to” the benefit
plan, unless the state law is “saved” by the
saving clause of section 514(b)(2)(A). Yet
another clause, the “deemer” clause of section
514(b)(2)(B) provides that an employer-based
benefit plan cannot be deemed to be in the
business of insurance to be regulated by state
law.3 1
A vital, albeit controversial, provision in ERISA
is the ability to preempt state government
regulations when there is a conflict between
ERISA’s provisions and the state law. Many
private sector employers have found particular
favor in this preemption instrument, and have
thus relied on it to expand employment
benefits to workers with the expectation that
their benefit plans will not be subject to the
maze of state regulations.3 2 To fully understand
the preemption clause, it is important to first
notice that states have traditionally enjoyed the
privilege to regulate the business of insurance.
But with enactment of ERISA, state regulations
are “saved” from preemption if the state law
regulates insurance proper, and does not
“relate to” benefits plans.3 3 However, the
“deemer” clause forbids re-characterization of
an employer-based plan as  health insurance
that may be subject to state regulation. Hence if
an employer elects to self-insure and assumes
all attendant risks, the benefit plan is exempt
from state regulations. But employers that do
not want to self-insure, and thus avoid the
financial risk of insurance, may purchase
insurance products for their employees with
the understanding that the benefit plan will be
subject to state regulations.3 4
5While it is customary for states to regulate in
areas also within the influence of federal law so
long as there is no conflict with federal laws,
ERISA’s preemption clause provides that it
supercedes all state laws that affect any
employee benefit plan. A significant exception
to this preemption clause allows states to
regulate health care providers and insurance
companies. However, ERISA also provides that
states may not consider employer-sponsored
benefit plans as insurers.3 5 In sum, the direct
consequences of the preemption clause are: (1)
employer-sponsored health plans cannot be
regulated by state laws; (2) insurance
companies that provide coverage to employer-
sponsored plans may be regulated by states;
and (3) states cannot regulate self-funded
employer-sponsored health plans.3 6 This leads
to the important distinction between self-
insured plans that “bear the risk” of insurance,
and thus are outside the reach of state laws,
and insured employer plans which states can
indirectly influence by regulating the insurance
companies that service them. Regardless of
how they are funded, both types of plans are
governed by ERISA. The number of employees
covered by self-insured plans vary amongst
states, but an estimated 40% of employees
covered by employer-sponsored plans
nationally is enrolled in self-insured plans.3 7
When a state regulation or law is challenged
under ERISA’s preemption clause, courts begin
by asking two basic questions: (1) Does the
state provision “relate to” an ERISA governed
plan? This question engages the following
issues – any direct reference to ERISA plans,
regulation of the same areas as ERISA,
regulates ERISA plans benefits, administration
or coverage, and imposition of substantial costs
on ERISA plans, (2) Is the state law “saved”
from preemption because it only regulates
insurance? To avoid preemption the state law
must be found not to affect an ERISA governed
plan or be found to be a law regulating only
insurance.3 8 For over twenty- five years, the US
Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA’s
preemption clause broadly to invalidate scores
of state regulations that either directly or
indirectly affect employer-sponsored health
benefit plans. These rulings severely curtailed
the ability of state policymakers to craft
healthcare finance programs needed to provide
general access to healthcare. However, in 1995,
two Supreme Court decisions provided the
flexibility states were sorely lacking. In the
Traveler Insurance decision, the Court upheld
part of New York’s hospital rate-setting
program that allowed the state to impose
surcharges on medical bills covered by insurers
except those paid by Blue Cross.3 9 This
program helped defray costs that Blue Cross
incurred as the insurer of last resort in the state.
While this inordinately burdened insurers
other than Blue Cross, the Court held that the
program was outside ERISA’s preemption
clause because it was a general tax law enacted
under the state’s public health regulatory
authority that did not target ERISA plans, and
affected every purchaser of healthcare. This
decision was significant because it ended the
presumption of unlimited preemptive powers
of ERISA. In the 1997 De Buono decision, the
Court applied similar reasoning, and upheld
New York’s authority to tax healthcare
providers even when the tax imposed added
burden on ERISA plans.4 0
IV. Policy Analysis:
The Benefits Are Too One-Sided
An employer that elects to establish a pension
and health care benefit plan is encouraged to
do so by the federal government. This
encouragement comes by way of tax subsidies
or tax-exemption.4 1 The benefits become more
remarkable if the employer also assumes the
risk of self-insurance. By becoming self-funded,
the employer avoids entirely the
inconveniences of state regulation through the
6Deemer Clause of ERISA. In this instance the
self-funded plan enjoys two distinct
advantages: tax exemption, and freedom from
state regulatory provisions. But the advantages
do not end here, for there is the issue of how
the fund is actually funded, or more to the
point, who actually funds the plan?
A closer look at the funding mechanism shows
that employees are in fact the sole providers of
funds to the plan. Economic principles inform
us that an employer will only hire labor if the
market value of labor’s productivity is at least
equal to the wage. But the wage labor receives
must be equal to its entire compensation
package. This package naturally includes
wages and any employment related benefits.
Thus, if labor, at the margin, is worth $10 per
hour to the employer, it will be an economic
anomaly for the employer to offer a cent higher
than ten dollars. But more often than not, labor
does not know its actual value in production,
and because it lacks this information it will
settle for a lower wage rate. The employer,
however, has this market information when
bargaining with labor, and since labor is
receiving less in wages, the employer can
afford to contribute the difference to labor’s
pension or health care benefit plan. From this
simple example, it is clear that labor actually
bears the burden of employment benefit plans,
and not the employer. So far the advantages to
the employer remain the same: tax exemption,
and exception from state regulation.
But what about the risk factor, the assumption
that self-funded plans run the risk of financial
insolvency if the level of claims far exceed
contributions to the fund?4 2 This assumption
quite clearly is an economic fiction, for no self-
respecting employer will voluntarily assume
such risk. The fact is that most self-funded
employers purchase stop-loss insurance
coverage from third-party insurers, and since
ERISA does not forbid this practice, it has
become customary practice.4 3 Thus, the
grounds for justifying the above- mentioned
advantages quickly evaporate. But since
employers that self-fund are usually large
operators, there is also the attendant benefit of
economies of scale that comes with size. These
large employers tend to seek and receive
significant discount from third-party insurers
due to the number of employees covered. This
is an added advantage, for it tends to reduce
the cost of employment. But the biggest benefit
to the employer is yet to be added, and this
comes from the fact that under ERISA, if the
plan administrator wrongfully withholds
benefits and the beneficiary suffers physical or
economic harm, courts can only authorize
payment for benefits withheld. The
administrator (and by extension, the employer)
cannot be held liable for damages.4 4 This is the
real advantage; employees, nonetheless,
continue to bear the burden of ERISA-
governed plans. But this burden is, to a certain
extent, mitigated by the fact that employment
benefits provided in the form of health benefits
are not subject to taxation.
Possible Remedial Measures
Given the uneven interpretation of benefits due
to the Preemption Clause, removal of this
clause, and permitting injured beneficiaries to
sue their health plans for injuries sustained due
either to a health plan’s independent action or
to malpractice of a health plan’s provider will
level the playing field, and provide equal
treatment to those enrolled in ERISA regulated
plans as well as to those enrolled in state-
regulated insurance plans. In order for
beneficiaries to receive adequate benefits under
their health plans, two needs must be met: first,
beneficiaries need sufficient information
regarding the financial incentives impacting
physicians’ decision-making so that the
beneficiary can make informed choices as to
when to follow a physician’s advice or seek
additional care; second, beneficiaries need
7quick, effective mechanisms for challenging
health plan benefit determinations and
utilization decisions.
Under the current state of affairs, there appears
to be little to compel health plans to give
beneficiaries information regarding financial
incentives or contractual requirements placed
upon health care providers, particularly
physicians, to make referrals, to refer to only
particular providers, or to limit diagnostic
procedures or treatments rendered.4 5 Patients
typically accept physicians’advice without
knowledge of any such contractual restrictions
or financial incentives. A few legislative
enactments have tried to address this issue, but
they have failed to provide for adequate
disclosure.4 6 The federal government has
recently begun to require managed care plans
which cover Medicare and Medicaid enrollees
to give information regarding such plan
incentives to enrollees upon request, but there
are no similar provisions protecting non-
governmental enrollees.4 7 Since many managed
care plans specifically prohibit plans from
providing information to patients, a number of
states have passed anti-gag laws which
prohibit contractual restrictions on a
physician’s ability to communicate with his or
her patients.4 8 These provisions prohibit a
managed care plan from restricting provider-
communications, and in the case of
governmental enrollees, compel disclosure
upon request; however, neither compels full or
complete disclosure to patients. This oversight
remains problematic and should be corrected
by legislative enactments that mandate full
disclosure of a plan’s contractual commitments.
V. Conclusion
A major Supreme Court decision in 1992
brought to the fore the glaring absence of
responsive state and federal regulations in
employee benefit plans governed by ERISA.4 9
The court rejected the appeal of a patient
infected with the HIV virus whose employer
had replaced its ERISA benefit plan that
provided a maximum coverage of $1 million
with one that capped its benefits at $5000.5 0
This is remarkable because at least 70% of
employers that offer employment-based health
insurance benefits has the ability to change
benefit levels under ERISA, and remain
unaccountable to state and federal regulatory
agencies.5 1 This built-in flexibility allows
employers to restrict access to health care,
terminate health care coverage when plan
beneficiaries need it most, and discriminate
against employees on the basis of medical
condition.
The consequences of the McGann decision, and
others like it, specifically in light of ERISA’s
provisions, are contrary to its presumed public
policy goals of providing adequate healthcare
coverage for every plan beneficiary, preventing
discrimination against employees with chronic
diseases, and ensuring that beneficiaries are not
subject to termination of their benefits when
they make heath care related claims.5 2 This
deficiency should be corrected by amendments
to ERISA that allow state governments to craft
adequate statutory provisions that address the
unique needs of both employers and
employees in the various states.
The goals of ERISA, as a matter of public
policy, are noble. The need to safeguard
pension and health plans remains cogent;
however, the means by which ERISA proposes
to achieve its stated objectives have been less
than salutary to the welfare of covered
employees. Unquestionably, the preemptive
powers of ERISA have marginalized and
detracted from what is otherwise a valuable
public policy. ERISA’s preemption clause
continues to be the source of outlandish
decisions that deny plan beneficiaries their
right to meaningful compensations when plan
administrators inflict harm. The clause is also
8responsible for the absence of state regulations
that should provide protection to plan
members when ERISA fails to properly protect
their welfare. This imperfection
notwithstanding, ERISA continues to be
serviceable; if only the preemption clause is
amended to allow for concurrent jurisdiction.
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malpractice.
47 Medicaid covers three primary groups: the
blind and disabled, the elderly, and poor
women and children. The amount spent
amongst them is about equal. Medicaid
payment for medical cost increased from $55
billion in 1987 to $91 billion in 1992, a 63%
increase. The growth in spending for poor
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women and children was more remarkable;
spending rose by 12.1% per year in the same
period. Spending also grew rapidly for the
blind(7.6 per year), and for the elderly(9.7 per
year). Originally, Medicaid coverage for the
poor was limited to recipients of AFDC. The
intent was to limit the program to single
women with children and income of about half
the poverty line or less. From 1987 Medicaid
eligibility was expanded to cover more than
AFDC recipients. By 1992, all pregnant women,
and children below age six in families with
income below 133% of poverty were eligible for
Medicaid, and so were all children with income
level below 100 % of the poverty line, and born
after September 30, 1983. See Paper by Mark
Duggan, “Hospital ownership and public
medical spending” The quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2000.
48 On October 7, 1999, The US House of
Representatives voted 275 to 151, with 206
democratic votes, to support an amendment to
ERISA, Title XXVII of the Public Health Service
Act, and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, to
protect consumers in managed care plans. See
[999-2000] 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 37, 126 Oct. 7,
1999.
49 John McGann was employed by the H& H
Music Company when he learned in 1987 that
he was infected with the HIV virus. After
McGann began to make health insurance
claims seeking reimbursement for medical
expenditure, the employer eliminated the
existing benefit plan. This plan had provided
maximum coverage of $1 million for all
diseases. The new plan adopted by H&H
Music Company still allowed coverage up to $1
million for all other diseases except AIDS,
which was capped at $5000. In 1989 McGann
brought suit alleging that his rights under
section 510 of ERISA had been violated. Section
510 of ERISA protects against discrimination in
plan coverage, and states in relevant part, “It
shall be unlawful for any person to
discriminate against a participant or
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he
is entitled under the provisions of an employee
benefit plan.” ERISA further prohibits
employers from discharging employees to
avoid economic effects of making substantial
payments from their benefit plans. McGann’s
pleadings alleged that the decision to terminate
the existing group health plan was a response
to his claims for reimbursement, and that the
current cap of $5000 was put in place to
deprive him of his rightful benefits. The Court
of Appeals held that H&H Music Company did
not violate section 510 of ERISA, and
concluded that when an employer’s group
insurance plan clearly states that the plan may
be amended or terminated, the employer is free
to do so even though such action may
adversely affect employees’ benefits. McGann
v. H&H Music Company, 946 F2d 401 (5th Cir.
1991).
50 Ibid.
51 See Wing, Kenneth, R; The Law and the
Public’s Health, Chicago: Health
Administartion Press, 1999
52 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498
U.S. 133 (1990).
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